Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

The State of Utah v. Earl Lee Smith : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Patrick V. Lindsay; Esplin/Weight; Margaret P. Lindsay; Counsel for Appellant.
Lohra L. Miller; District Attorney for Salt Lake City; R. Josh Player; Deputy District Attorney;
Counsel for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Smith, No. 20060959 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6899

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
Case No. 20060959-CA

-V.-

EARL LEE SMITH,
Defendant / Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ASSAULT, A CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102, IN
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT LAKE
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN PRESIDING
LOHRA L. MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
R. JOSH PLAYER (7768)
Deputy District Attorney
8080 South Redwood Road, Suite 1100
West Jordan, UT 84088
Telephone: (801) 233-9900
Counsel for Appellee
PATRICK V. LINDSAY (8309)
Esplin/Weight
290 West Center Street
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah, 84603-4912
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6309)
99 E Center Street
P.O. Box 1895
Orem,UT 84053-1895
Counsel for Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
Case No. 20060959-CA

-V.-

EARL LEE SMITH,
Defendant / Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ASSAULT, A CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102, IN
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT LAKE
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN PRESIDING
LOHRA L. MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
R. JOSH PLAYER (7768)
Deputy District Attorney
8080 South Redwood Road, Suite 1100
West Jordan, UT 84088
Telephone: (801) 233-9900
Counsel for Appellee
PATRICK V. LINDSAY (8309)
Esplin/Weight
290 West Center Street
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah, 84603-4912
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6309)
99 E Center Street
P.O. Box 1895
Orem,UT 84053-1895
Counsel for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of the Proceedings

2
2

B. Summary of Facts

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
6
1. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF DR. BEALL BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY
WOULD HAVE CALLED FOR A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF
SPECULATION AND WOULD NOT CONTAIN SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL,
OR OTHER SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE THAT WOULD ASSIST THE
JURY
6
2. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-143(1) IN CALLING AN EXPERT WITNESS
9
CONCLUSION

10

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1999)
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 (Utah 1993)
State v. Kelley, 2001 UT 41, 1 P.3d 546
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah 1993)
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1988)
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (2007)
Rules
Utah Rules of Evidence 702
Utah Rules of Evidence 704(b)

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
Case No. 20060959-CA
-V.-

EARL LEE SMITH,
Defendant / Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* **

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Defendant appeals from a conviction for Assault, a Class B
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102. The Utah Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction over all criminal convictions that do not involve a first
degree felony or a capital offense pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e).
Because the contested conviction is a misdemeanor violation, the Utah Court of
Appeals has appellate jurisdiction.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of Proceedings
The Appellant was charged with one count of Assault on a Correctional
Officer, a Class A Misdemeanor, one count of Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor,
one count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class B
Misdemeanor, one count Criminal Trespass, a Class C Misdemeanor, and one
count of Disorderly Conduct, a Class C Misdemeanor. On March 18, 2005, the
Appellant entered not guilty pleas on all counts. After several pre-trial
conferences, the Honorable Terry L. Christiansen presided over a jury trial on
August 22, 2006. Count III, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, was
dismissed, and the jury found the Appellant guilty on the remaining four counts.
On October 10, 2006, the Appellant was sentenced to a term of 365 days
on Count I, Assault on a Correctional Officer, to 180 days on Count II, Assault,
and to 90 days each on the remaining counts, Criminal Trespass and Disorderly
Conduct. The court suspended all of the jail time, and the Appellant was placed
on probation for 18 months to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. In
addition, the Appellant was ordered to pay a fine of $600.00 plus interest and
attorney's fees in the amount of $700.00. The Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal
on October 12, 2006.

B. Summary of Facts
The Defendant testified that on the evening of February 25, 2005, he was
at the Filling Station, a bar in Magna, Utah. (R. 231 at 165). The Defendant got
on the stage at the bar and began rapping into the microphone about his son, who
had died in an accident in the fall of 2003. (R. 231 at 52, 166). Other witnesses
at the bar that evening, Marco Guerrero, Brian Jones, Darren Lewis, Elliott
Perfili, and Petra Rolfson, testified that the Defendant was rapping about
Hispanics and Magna, and cursing while on stage. (R. 231 at 63, 82, 98, 108,
152). In response to these statements, Marco Guerrero approached the Defendant
and told him to "shut his mouth." (R. 2311 63). While the Defendant testified
that Mr. Guerrero made a comment about the Defendant's deceased son as he
approached, Mr. Guerrero denied saying anything about the Defendant's son, and
no other witnesses heard such a statement. (R. 231 at 68, 89, 101, 123, 167). Mr.
Guerrero testified that the Defendant initiated a shoving match, in which a
security officer, Brian Jones, intervened. (R. 231 at 63, 83). Mr. Jones got
between Mr. Guerrero and the Defendant and separated them out to about arms'
length. (R. 231 at 83). Mr. Jones turned to Mr. Guerrero and told him to "knock
it off," and as Mr. Jones turned to talk to the Defendant, the Defendant punched
Mr. Jones. (R. 231 at 83). Mr. Jones then pinned the Defendant against the wall
in a control-type hold. (R. 231 at 85). At this point, the other security officers
who had been working that night escorted the Defendant out of the bar. (R. 231
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at 86). Mr. Perfili informed the Defendant he was not welcome to return to the
bar. (R. 231 at 112).
However, the Defendant returned to the bar for a second time that evening
shortly thereafter. (R. 231 at 64, 86, 99, 112). The Defendant testified that he
returned to the bar that evening to retrieve a locket that he had lost. (R. 231 at
171). However, upon entering the bar, the Defendant saw Mr. Guerrero and
"snapped." (R. 231 at 171). The Defendant approached Mr. Guerrero from
behind and punched him. (R. 231 at 64, 171). For the second time that evening,
security officers restrained the Defendant and escorted him from the bar. (R. 231
at 64, 87, 88, 113). Because the Defendant did not calm down and was
continuing to make threatening remarks, Mr. Perfili decided to call the police.
(R. 231 at 114).
Officer Miguel Miranda responded to the call from The Filling Station.
(R. 231 at 139). Based off of witness statements and surveillance footage he had
seen that evening, Officer Miranda went to speak with the Defendant. (R. 231 at
141, 142). The Defendant appeared agitated and angry, and Officer Miranda
arrested him. (R. 231 at 142, 143.) While parked in the jail stall, Officer
Miranda began writing down information he needed so he could log things into
the jail computer. (R. 231 at 143). The Defendant again appeared agitated and
asked why Officer Miranda was taking so long. (R. 231 at 143). At this point,
the Defendant cleared his throat, leaned up in the seat, and spit towards Officer
Miranda's face. (R. 231 at 143).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert.. .may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." Utah Rule of Evidence 702. The critical factor is whether the expert
has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues before it.
State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f 12. It is well established that trial courts have wide
discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. See Kelley, 2000
UT 41, f 11; Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1999); State v.
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993); Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1337
(Utah 1993); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1988). Consequently,
absent a clear abuse of this discretion, an appellate court will not reverse the trial
court's determination. See Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the
testimony of Dr. Beall regarding the Defendant's state of mind on the night of the
incident. The testimony would have called for a substantial amount of
speculation, and the testimony would not contain scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge that would assist the jury. The jury was aware of the
Defendant's background in losing his son, and they could assume a reasonable
response of an individual under those circumstances. Furthermore, the Defendant
did not comply with Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3(1) in giving the State proper
notice of his intent to call an expert witness.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF DR. BEALL BECAUSE
THE TESTIMONY WOULD HAVE CALLED FOR A SUBSTANTIAL
AMOUNT OF SPECULATION AND WOULD NOT CONTAIN
SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, OR OTHER SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE
THAT WOULD ASSIST THE JURY.
The trial court properly refused to admit the testimony of Dr. Beall
regarding the Defendant's mental state on the night of the incident. "It is well
established that trial courts have wide discretion in determining the admissibility
of expert testimony." State v. Kelley, 2001 UT 41, f 11. See also Patey v.
Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1999); State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361
(Utah 1993); Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 (Utah 1993); State v. Shickles,
760 P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1988). Consequently, absent a clear abuse of discretion,
an appellate court will not reverse the trial court's determination regarding expert
testimony. Id. The trial court did not abuse its discretion as the expert witness
would not have been able to testify as to the Defendant's state of mind when he
attacked Mr. Guerrero, under Rule 704(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Specifically, Rule 704(b) provides,
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of
a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
In the present case, the Defendant argues that his psychologist, Dr. Beall, should
have been allowed to testify regarding the Defendant's mental state upon hearing
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a negative comment regarding the Defendant's deceased son. The Defendant
argues that he was likely to have considered the comment as fighting words, thus
making his reaction of assaulting Mr. Guerrero an act of self-defense given his
state of mind upon hearing the comment. The Defendant wanted "Mr. Beall to
testify to Mr. Smith's state of mind or probable state of mind when Mr. Guerrero
made a statement about his son." (R. 231 T 137). Under Rule 704(b) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, this testimony from Dr. Beall would have been inappropriate.
Dr. Beall would not have been able to testify to the Defendant's state of mind
upon hearing a comment about his deceased son in order to establish a defense of
self-defense for the Defendant.
Additionally, the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony is set
forth in Rule 702 of the Utah Rule of Evidence. Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of opinion or otherwise.
The critical factor is "whether that expert has knowledge that can assist the trier
of fact in resolving the issues before it." Kelley, 2000 UT 41 at f 12 {quoting
Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d at 1196). Jurors are likely to give great weight to
expert testimony, so it can only be introduced when the court is persuaded the
jury will benefit from help on the topic for which the expert testimony is
proposed. Therefore, use of expert testimony is appropriate where the subject
matter of the testimony is beyond the ken of the jury.
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Furthermore, the testimony of Dr. Beall that the Defendant would become
upset upon hearing about his deceased son is not beyond the ken of a reasonable
jury. The jury was given testimony from the Defendant claiming that Mr.
Guerrero had made such a statement; and the jury was given testimony from Mr.
Guerrero that he did not make such a statement. Further, the jury was presented
with testimony from Mr. Jones, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Perfili, and Ms. Rolfson that a
statement regarding the Defendant's son was never heard. The jury was in a
position to determine which testimony to believe. If the jury believed the
statement was made, a reasonable person could infer an appropriate reaction
under the circumstances. Testimony regarding the state of mind of a parent who
has lost a child when an individual comments on the loss of that child is not
scientific, technical, nor specialized, requiring an expert. It is not beyond the ken
of the jury to understand that upon hearing Mr. Guerrero make a comment about
the Defendant's deceased son, the Defendant would become upset and defensive.
Further, the testimony proffered by Dr. Beall would call for a substantial amount
of speculation.
The Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it refused to
undertake any inquiry as to the probativeness of Dr. Beall's testimony under
Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. However, before the
testimony of Dr. Beall would be admissible under Rules 402 and 403, the expert
testimony must comply with Rules 702 and 704(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
8

Honorable Terry L. Christiansen found that the testimony of Dr. Beall regarding
the Defendant's mental state on the night of the incident would call for a
substantial amount of speculation. It would be improper to allow Dr. Beall to
testify to the Defendant's mental state in order to establish self-defense under
Rule 704(b). Further, Dr. Beall's testimony that the Defendant became upset at a
negative comment regarding his deceased son is not scientific, technical, nor
specialized knowledge that would require expert testimony to assist the jury. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the testimony of Dr.
Beall.
POINT 2: THE DEFENDANT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-3(1) IN CALLING AN
EXPERT WITNESS.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3(l)(a) provides:
If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify at trial
or at any hearing regarding the mental state of the defendant or another,
the party intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party
as soon as practicable, but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days
before any hearing at which the testimony is offered.
(2007). In the present case, the Defendant failed to give notice to the State of his
intention to call an expert witness regarding his mental state 30 days before trial.
In fact, the issue was raised for the first time at trial. (R. 231 at 136). Because
the Defendant failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3(1), the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the expert testimony of Dr. Beall.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to
affirm the Defendant's conviction.

Dated this jZ/day of August, 2007
LOHRA L. MILLER
District Attorney of Salt Lake County

R./K)SH PLAYER
Deputy District Attorney

10

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered/mailed, first class
postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing to Patrick V.
Lindsay and Margaret P. Lindsay, Attorneys for Earl Lee Smith, 290 West Center
Street, P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84603, this
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day of August, 2007.

ADDENDA

77-14-3. Testimony regarding mental state of defendant or another — Notice requirements —
Right to examination.
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify at trial or at any hearing
regarding the mental state of the defendant or another, the party intending to call the expert shall give
notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days
before any hearing at which the testimony is offered. Notice shall include the name and address of the
expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report.
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed testimony. If the expert has not
prepared a report or the report does not adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's
proposed testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that opinion, the party intending
to call the expert shall provide a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient to
give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any
report prepared by the expert when available.
(2) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party receiving notice shall provide
notice to the other party of witnesses whom the party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony,
including the name and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. If available, a
report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided. If the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the
report does not adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed rebuttal testimony,
or in the event the witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the rebuttal witness shall provide a
written explanation of the witness's anticipated rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the opposing party
adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by any
rebuttal expert when available.
(3) If the prosecution or the defense proposes to introduce testimony of an expert which is based
upon personal contact, interview, observation, or psychological testing of the defendant, testimony of an
expert involving a mental diagnosis of the defendant, or testimony of an expert that the defendant does
or does not fit a psychological or sociological profile, the opposing party shall have a corresponding
right to have its own expert examine and evaluate the defendant.
(4) This section applies to any trial, sentencing hearing, and other hearing, excluding a preliminary
hearing, whether or not the defendant proposes to offer evidence of the defense of insanity or diminished
mental capacity.
(5) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this section, the opposing
party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the
testimony. If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faith on the
part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions.
(6) This section may not require the admission of evidence not otherwise admissible.
Amended by Chapter 139,1994 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 77_0F004.ZIP 2,999 Bytes
Sections in this ChapterjChapters in this Title|All Titles|Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Monday, April 30, 2007

Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), was substantially the same.

Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue.
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state
an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with Rule 56(4), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). See Edwards v.
Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1979).
This rule is identical to Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as amended in 1984.

